The Resurgence and Growth of Private
Higher Education in China
Qiang Zha
Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education,
University of Toronto
Abstract:
This paper concentrates on two issues. The first pertains to
legitimacy, policy and implementation in China’s private higher education in
terms of its context, definition and characteristics. In terms of the second
issue, this paper examines how the flourishing market economy and the policy of
decentralization adopted by the Chinese leadership have supported the emergence
and growth of private higher education in China. It also explores the
implications of such a change to diversity and equity for the national system.
It seems that China epitomizes the international tendency to look toward
private higher education as a way to meet otherwise contradictory enrollment
and financial incentives. With this highly ‘instrumental’ approach, China’s
private higher education appears to have a negative effect on diversity and
equity in the system.
Introduction:
S |
ince the
foundation of the People’s Republic of China, China’s higher education has been
under the government’s control, characterized by the notion of ‘central control
and allocation’ (Williams, Liu & Shi, 1997). It was not until the mid 1980s
that the Chinese government began to diversify educational services, allowing
and encouraging the establishment of institutions run by the non-state sector.
In recent years, private higher education has been undergoing rapid development
in China, particularly in big cities. By 1999, there were 1,277 private higher
education institutions in the country, hosting 1.23 million students1 (Qu,
2000).
This paper concentrates on two issues. The first pertains to
legitimacy, policy and implementation in China’s private higher education. This
discussion examines the issue in terms of context, definition and
characteristics. The second issue has more far reaching implications and
pertains to factors affecting diversity and equity. This paper attempts to
examine how the flourishing market economy and the policy of decentralization
adopted by the Chinese government have supported the emergence and growth of
private higher education in China, and explores the implications of such a
change to diversity and equity for the national system.
This paper employs the analytical frameworks developed by Geiger
(1987) and Levy (1999) in their studies on private higher education. Geiger
(1987) makes an important point when he argues for the ‘limit of
privatization’: “In the final analysis private higher education is not a
determinative form. Rather, the nature and consequences of private higher
education are relative to the national system in
which it is embedded” (p. 244). Similarly, Levy (1999) identifies
privatization’s ‘limits to diversity’, and argues that “privatization carries
isomorphic as well as diversifying effects; diversifying effects may diminish
over time” (p. 37). This paper begins with an outline of the conceptual
frameworks used within this analysis.
Conceptual
Frameworks
A |
ccording to
Geiger (1987), there are three basic forms of privatization in higher
education. In the first type, the higher education system is dominated by the
‘mass private sectors with restricted public sectors’. The second type is a
parallel system in which both the private and public sectors play a role in
providing higher education services. In the third type, the private sector
plays a very limited role – the ‘peripheral private sector’. Geiger’s (1987) thesis,
briefly stated, is that the amount and kind of higher education provided by
government is the single most important determinant of the size and character
of private higher education in each national system. Mass private sectors have
arisen in countries where the provision of public higher education has been
limited to relatively few institutions of generally high academic standing. The
distinctive feature of the mass private sector is the accommodation of a large
proportion of students in low-cost, low-quality institutions, created to absorb
excess demand, with inadequate resources and part-time staff. Parallel systems
are characterized by a symmetrical relationship of private and public sectors,
and require three conditions: a) the existence of ‘legitimate’ cultural groups
whose interests are represented in the polity; b) a single high national
standard for university degrees; and c) extensive government subsidization of
private institutions in order to equalize conditions with the public sector.
Peripheral private sectors emerge to serve purposes not acknowledged by the
state, where public sectors are designed to fulfill all of the recognized need
for higher education. Government support for higher education is concentrated
in the comprehensive public sector. Peripheral private sector institutions are
unlikely to have the resources to compete academically with public sector
institutions. Geiger maintains that “these factors make peripheral private
institutions among the most private in higher education” (p. 237).
Levy’s (1999) thesis is not new. Rather, it draws upon
perspectives of two bodies of literature that are often consulted to tackle the
systemic diversity issue in higher education. One body of literature is
essentially descriptive, attempting to track developments in private higher
education. This literature usually depicts ample and expanding organizational
diversity resulting from privatization (for example, Bowen et al., 1997;
Cerych, 1995; Geiger, 1986, 1987; Pan & Wei, 1995; Zhou, 1995). The other
body of literature, the ‘new institutionalism’, is essentially theoretical,
attempting to identify, explain and predict developments within organizational
fields. The new institutionalism highlights isomorphism, a process of
convergence that yields similarities among organizations (for example, DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983, 1991). According to Levy (1999), the contrast here is that
the literature on private higher education more often depicts or assumes
rational and free-choice dynamics that lead mostly to diversity, while the new
institutionalism finds such dynamics exaggerated, inadequate, or otherwise
misleading for depicting and explaining organizational configurations.
Levy (1999) notes further that important limitations mark the
organizational diversity brought about by private higher education. He argues
that privatization is often but not always about something different,
innovative and rationally responsive to stated goals. He uses the new
institutionalism’s core concept of isomorphism to illustrate why and how
private higher education closely resembles public higher education, failing to
add great diversity to the system. In his analysis, Levy basically follows
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) formulation of isomorphism, which identifies three
chief categories: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. According to
DiMaggio and Powell, coercive isomorphism results from pressure applied by
cultural expectations and by other organizations on which the organization of
interest is dependent. Mimetic isomorphism stems from uncertainty caused by
poorly understood technologies, ambiguous goals and the symbolic environment.
Normative isomorphism arises primarily from professionalization, involving two
aspects of professionalization: the first is the homogenizing influence of
established norms, and the second is the growth and elaboration of professional
networks. To Levy (1999), two implications can be identified when isomorphism
is related to contemporary higher education privatization, in terms of intersectoral
(private resembling public) and intrasectoral (private emulating private)
dynamics. First, isomorphism can inhibit the appearance of private
characteristics within the public sector. Second, it can block the very
emergence or subsequent growth of a separate private sector. The new
institutionalism highlights evidence that organizations operate chiefly in
routine, unreflective, constrained modes. These modes lead to extensive copying
-- isomorphism.
Phases of Development of Private Higher
Education in China
P |
rivate
education has existed in China through the centuries ever since the days of the
Spring and Autumn periods (770 to 475 B.C.), and flourished in the Han Dynasty
(206 B.C. to 220 A.D.). During the Tang Dynasty (619 to 907), while higher education
institutions were maintained mainly by the government, private academies of
learning (shuyuan) started to grow, and persisted all the way through to the
late Qing period (1636 to 1911) (Ding & Liu, 1992; Yang & Peng, 1992).
It is estimated that there were about twelve hundred such academies in the Ming
period, and the number rose to over nineteen hundred academies by the Qing
period (Chen et al., 1981).
Since the Opium War of the mid-1800s, private missionary schools
and universities gradually arose all over China. By 1917, 80% of the total
university student population were from missionary universities (China National
Institute of Educational Science Research, 1995). Even in 1950, shortly after
the founding of the People’s Republic of China, 77 of the total of 227
universities were private, holding over 40% of enrollments (Min, 1994).
However, following in the footsteps of the Soviet model, all the private
institutions of higher education were transformed into public ones by 1956,
after the reorganization of universities and departments. With this, the long
history of private higher education in China closed its first chapter, and
Chinese citizens became accustomed to free education provided by the state
sector. The second chapter of the new development of private higher education
in China can be traced back to early the 1980s when China launched its economic
reform.
The economic modernization drive has not only fostered the growth
of a market economy but has also caused a structural change in education.
Reform in educational structure started in the mid-1980s, reshuffling the
monopolistic role of the state in provision of education. It has manifested a
mix of private and public consumption (Cheng, 1995; Hayhoe, 1996; Mok, 1996).
It is worth noting that, in China, the definition of a private institution is
complex. It is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly the difference between
private and minban or people-run educational institutions. The term minban
refers to institutions run by the non-state sector, including privately and
collectively (such as a Democratic Party or other legally approved groups)
owned institutions2. But very
often, people use the terms ‘private’ and ‘minban’ interchangeably. Those
working in privately-owned institutions tend to label their institutions as
minban instead of private for the sake of ‘survival’: the former term has a
nonprofit implication, and, in a society like China’s where there is a
considerable asymmetry of information between providers and consumers of educational
services, consumers can have greater trust in nonprofit organizations. In
general, the new growth of private higher education in China in recent years
can be divided into three different periods that outline the rise,
rectification and development of private higher education from 1982 to the
present.
The Rise of Private Higher Education
(1982-1986)
I |
n March
1982, exactly thirty years after the closing of the first chapter of private
higher education, China inaugurated its first minban higher education
institution – the Zhonghu Zhehui University – in Beijing, the nation’s capital
city (China National Institute of Educational Science Research, 1995). In
December 1982, the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislature,
promulgated a new Constitution of China, with the nineteenth article
stipulating that “the state encourages collective economic organizations,
governmental enterprises and other social groups to initiate and administer
various kinds of legal educational activities.” In 1985, a policy paper
entitled the Decision on Reform of the Educational Structure, issued by the
Central Committee of the China Communist Party, indicated that the state
attempted to diversify educational services by encouraging all democratic
parties, non-governmental organizations, social bodies, retired cadres and
intellectuals, collective economic organizations and individuals subject to the
Party and governmental policies, and to actively and voluntarily contribute to
developing education by various forms and methods (Hu, 1999; Wei & Zhang,
1995). This period saw the expansion of over one hundred minban and
private higher education institutions across the country. Private higher
education has been developing since then (Hu, 1999).
The Rectification of Private Higher
Education (1987-1991)
I |
n 1987, the
State Education Commission promulgated a document, Provisional
Regulations
on the Social Forces Running Educational Establishments, which attempted to
rectify some of the disorders in the governance and management of minban
schools as well as in their conferring of diplomas, among other issues and
problems encountered (Zhu, 1996). It seems that those very issues and problems
made the education authorities more prudent in handling private higher
education affairs, and “skeptics are beginning to take notice of this
resurgence” (Yang, 1997, p. 8).
In order to provide a forum for the community of private higher
education, a first national conference on minban higher education was held in
Wuhan, Hubei in January 1989, at which more than 70 minban higher education
institutions were represented. The conference came up with a platform of five
concrete suggestions on issues of importance, as well as a call for the
educational authorities to take a more liberal approach to reform (Wei &
Zhang, 1995). During this period of rectification, the quality of minban higher
education institutions varied significantly, and thus regulation of them seemed
necessary.
Development of Private Higher Education
(1992-present)
T |
he year of
1992 marked the advent of spring for China’s private higher education,
when Deng
Xiaoping undertook his southern inspection tour, at the beginning of year, to
advocate renewed economic reform. Shortly after Deng’s tour to Southern China,
the China Communist Party openly endorsed the adoption of a socialist market
economy in its 14th National Party Congress.
Recognizing the fact that the state alone can never meet people’s
pressing educational needs, the Chinese leadership has deliberately devolved
responsibilities to other non-state sectors to engage in educational
development. In 1993, the Program for Educational Reform and Development of
China stated for the first time the national policy towards the development of
non-state-run education as “active encouragement, strong support, proper
guidelines, and sound management” (Hu, 1999). In 1995, China’s Education Law
was promulgated, with the 25 articles reconfirming that the state would give
full support to enterprises, social forces, local communities and individuals
to establish schools under the legal framework of the People’s Republic of
China (State Education Commission, 1995). On October 1, 1997, the State Council
officially enacted the Regulations on the Social Forces Running Educational Establishments,
which put the governance of private higher education on a firm legal basis.
There are eight chapters in the Regulations, the contents of which cover the
legal status of private higher education institutions, the criteria for the
establishment of such institutions, the formal procedures for applying to set
up such establishments, the process of evaluation and appraisal by the
educational authorities, and the internal administration and governance of
these institutions (State Council, 1997).
By 1994, there were altogether more than 800 private higher
education institutions across the nation. This number has been steadily growing
ever since to 1230 in 1996, 1252 in 1997, and 1277 in 1999. Among these, only
37 are fully recognized by the Ministry of Education, with authority to grant
their own graduation diplomas, while the remainders can only issue students
with certificates3 (Hu, 1999; Mok, 2000; Yang, 2000). All in all, the
resurgence and growth of private higher education indicates that China has
already shifted from state monopoly to a mixed economy of education.
Context, Rationale and Characteristics of
Private Higher Education in China
I |
n China,
prior to reform, the state played a dominant role not only in decision-making
but also in the implementation of educational policies through the Ministry of
Education, its executive arm. The Ministry of Education, regardless of regional
differences and variations, tried to manipulate all major decisions and work
out every detail for local institutions for a variety of issues including the
design of curricula and syllabuses, deciding on textbooks, academic calendars,
student admissions4, graduate job assignments, budgets,
salary scales, and personnel affairs. The adoption of a centralization policy in
the higher educational sphere gave the central government a relatively tight
control over financing, provision and management of education. It was believed
that, since China had started to build a socialist central planning economy,
the higher education system should thus be brought under the direct leadership
of the government so as to best serve the centrally planned manpower needs.
Living in this policy context, Chinese citizens were accustomed to free public
education. However, over the years, the excessive government control resulted
in deficiencies in the system. In fact, Chinese higher education drew upwards
of 90% of its budget from the central government, while catering to less than
2% of the appropriate age group (Zha, 1994). Openly
realizing that the state alone cannot provide sufficient educational services
to satisfy heightened social aspirations and parental expectations, the State
has deliberately devolved responsibilities to other non-state sectors to engage
themselves in educational endeavours. In
return, it has continuously reduced its subsidies, provision and regulation by
emphasizing the importance of individual responsibilities, and by encouraging
local communities and social organizations to create additional educational
opportunities. Reshuffling the monopolistic role of the state in educational
provision, the reform in educational structure that began in the mid-1980s has
manifested a convergence towards a mix of private and public provision (Cheng,
1995; Hayhoe, 1996; Mok, 1996). Coinciding with the theory of ‘multiple
channels’ in financing, the state describes the use of a mixed economy of
welfare as a ‘multiple-channel’ and ‘multi-method’ approach to the provision of
educational services during the ‘primary state of socialism’, indicating a
diffusion of responsibility from the state to society (Cheng, 1990; Mok, 1996).
After the endorsement of a socialist market economy in 1992 in the
14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, self-financing and
fee-charging principles have been widely adopted and finally legitimized in
China’s higher education system. From 1997 onwards, all students enrolling in
higher education have to pay tuition fees. The central government therefore
encourages a more direct relationship between those who provide educational
services and those who pay for them. In fact, it is now difficult to draw a
very clear public-private distinction in China’s education sector. This is
particularly evident when one considers that public schools are becoming more ‘private’
as ideas/principles and practices that are popular in the market/private sector
are also employed by public schools. In this regard, for a robust discussion on
development of private higher education in China, it would be necessary to
include not only institutions that call themselves private but also public
institutions that in many ways appear increasingly to be private, thus making
the distinction between private and public problematic.
Put in a global policy context, the growth of private higher
education, coupled with the adoption of market principles and strategies in
recovering education costs, suggests that China is moving towards a similar
global process of privatization. The process
of privatization involves a fundamental restructuring of state activities in
relation to the extent of social intervention. Recent decades have brought
considerable questioning of the state’s ability to continue monopolizing the
provision of public services. Realizing the importance of productivity, performance,
and control, governments worldwide have begun to engage themselves in
transforming the way that services are managed (Flynn, 1997). With emphasis
given to effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the delivery of public
services, privatization is introduced into the administration of the public
services (Mok, 1997; Walsh, 1995).
In essence, privatization is concerned with the transfer of
responsibility originally shouldered by the state to the non-state sector, or
with a change in the nature of government involvement (Foster, 1992; Johnson,
1990). Being one of the major public responsibilities, education is
unquestionably affected by the strong tide of privatization, which suggests
that a less state directed approach is adopted, and which advocates market
ideologies and practices in running education services. In short, the
prominence of privatization in the educational sphere seems to be a feature of
the globalization agenda.
In a very recent study, Altbach (1999) maintains that the
prominence of private higher education is linked to the ideology of
privatization that is so influential at present, and with the trend worldwide
to cut public spending.
Private higher education is one of the most dynamic and
fastest-growing segments of postsecondary education at the turn of the 21st
century. A combination of unprecedented demand for access to higher education
and the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide the necessary
support has brought private higher education to the forefront. Private institutions…
are expanding in scope and number, and are increasingly important in parts of
the world that have relied on the public sector. A related phenomenon is the
“privatization” of public institutions in some countries. With tuition and
other charges rising, public and private institutions look more and more
similar (p. 1).
The foregoing discussion seems to suggest that China’s recent
growth of private higher education resembles the worldwide experience of
privatization. However, closer scrutiny indicates that China’s experience is
certainly different from that in much of the world because the strategies
adopted by Chinese leadership are highly ‘instrumental’ in terms of creating
more educational opportunities in response to emerging market needs. The aim is
to improve administrative efficiency and effectiveness as well as to resolve
the financial difficulties of the State-provided free education, rather than to
make a fundamental shift of value orientation towards ‘public choice’ ideas.
This point could be revealed by the condemnation of the ‘private element’ in
the educational sector by not allowing ‘profit-making’ arrangements (see
Article 6 of Chapter I in the Regulations on the Social Forces Running
Educational Establishments). Also, it is clearly stated by Article 5 of Chapter
I in the same document that the “state restricts social forces from running
higher education institutions”. Some scholars argue that it is because the
Chinese leadership has not committed itself ideologically to the private sector
(Mok, 2000).
Furthermore, non-state higher education institutions,
acknowledging the immense difficulties in competing with their state-funded
counterparts, deliberately differentiate themselves from state-funded
institutions by specializing in practical and ‘market-driven’ courses. Put in
another way, higher vocational education is almost the universal choice among
private institutions. In addition to State-stipulated areas of study, the
curricula of these private institutions commonly emphasizes foreign languages
and computer training as well as other practical subjects5.
Only a handful of the private institutions are officially recognized by the
government, and a high concentration of their students have failed elsewhere to
gain access to state higher education institutions. It seems, then, that
China’s private higher education institutions cluster at the bottom of the
national system. It seems that the resurgence of private higher education in
China has not created the first or second type of privatization in higher
education as outlined by Geiger (1987). Rather, it is Gieger’s third type of
private higher education that is emerging in China. Such a development suggests
that the private higher education plays a very limited role, characterized
by the term ‘peripheral private sector’.
The Effects on Diversity and Equity
D |
iscussions
on private higher education inevitably invite discussions about diversity and
equity. For private higher education, the issue of diversity is significant.
“To make a difference, for better or worse, private higher education must bring
something important not otherwise found in the higher education system” (Levy,
1999, p. 15). However, there is a paradox in worldwide privatization: for all
the ideological push associated with privatization and linked to private-public
distinctiveness, much of the practical drive is merely to reduce state costs
and responsibilities instead of promoting diversity. Typically, a feasible way
to do so is simply to promote growth that is rarely special or distinctive in
terms of academics or innovation. Unfortunately, this is what is happening in
China.
When the concept of isomorphism is applied to this analysis, it is
fair to say that in China, where government coercive forces for conformity are
traditionally significant, coercive isomorphism historically has helped to
abolish private higher education, and now serves to delay creation of a
distinctive private higher education. With close scrutiny, it is not difficult
to identify coercive and non-coercive isomorphism, in particular mimetic
isomorphism, in China’s context.The State and the public higher education
sector are the chief coercive forces. In China, the public higher education
sector remains much larger than the private sector in terms of enrollment size,
and greater still in financial terms. Given its predominance in expensive
fields of study, graduate programs and research, the private sector is thus
forced to be isomorphic to the public sector, and very narrow in scope and
purpose. In a very conforming society like China, many private higher education
institutions are just duplicates of the public institutions in terms of
curriculum, teaching and learning arrangement, and evaluation and assessment.
Under severe financial constraints, they are very bound to traditional delivery
methods. Furthermore, private institutions survive only when they can claim
some success in preparing these students for public examinations, by which
these students are assessed in the same arena as those in public institutions.
The notion of normative copying through professionalism is also
pertinent to this analysis, as most professors and sometimes administrators in
China’s private higher education institutions are drawn from the public pool.
As private higher education is new and rapidly developing in China, it depends
on graduates of public programs, often socialized to certain norms. Most of
China’s private institutions rely heavily on retired professors from public
universities as their teaching staff. In fact, what most characterizes the
private sector’s teaching staff is a low level of professionalism, but this
lack of professional or normative isomorphism leaves room for mimetic
isomorphism. The very weakness of professional forces can add to the force of
mimetic isomorphism that is driven by the need to copy in situations where an
institution is otherwise ill equipped to set its own course or to gain
legitimacy through innovation. Thus, there is a tendency for many private
higher education institutions to refer to themselves as secondary colleges
affiliated to a public university. This assists them in gaining legitimacy and
in building their reputations. Besides, it is common for new private
institutions to copy their peers to gain a footing and legitimacy.
As noted earlier, the goal of educational reform in China is to
improve efficiency, not to realize egalitarian ideology. Hence, the move
towards privatization favors only the elite and wealthy families who are
privileged to start with because of their social status and financial
capability. Letting market forces fully determine who studies at private higher
education institutions ensures that only students who can afford the tuition
will be able to attend. As a result, private institutions contribute little to
social mobility or to providing educational opportunities for bright but
underprivileged students. As earnings are associated with learning in a
knowledge-based society, and because higher education is still the only means
for a person to legally change from rural to urban citizenship, the emergence
of private higher education is likely to perpetuate social disparity.
In China, such a move to privilege the privileged doesn’t seem to
attract much opposition. There could be two explanations. The first, and
perhaps the most essential, is that meritocracy prevails in the society of
China. In such a culture of meritocracy, the concept of equity goes only as far
as students of the poor families are not deprived of opportunities for
competition. The second explanation is that a society like China is basically a
planned and conforming one. Despite the move towards more liberal policies in
recent years, a collective tradition still underlies the political ideology,
and the public is used to the governmental arrangement.
Conclusion
T |
he last
decade has witnessed the resurgence and growth of private higher education in
China. One major purpose of the growth of China’s private higher education is
to supplement inadequate public sector and state finance in higher education.
After all, China still has only a small percentage of the pertinent age cohort
in higher education – less than 8% – a percentage deemed too low for China’s
economic aspirations. At the same time, China has a market-oriented goal of
escaping the constraints that revolve around state finance. China thus
epitomizes the international tendency to look to private higher education as a
way to meet otherwise contradictory enrollment and financial objectives. With
this highly ‘instrumental’ approach, China’s private higher education appears
to have a negative effect on diversity and equity in the system. A flourishing
market economy and the policy of decentralization adopted by the Chinese
government have supported the emergence and growth of a private higher education
system in China that fosters unquestionable disparities and contradictions that
suggest a need for further research.
Endnotes
1. These
figures are provided to contrast with the 1,942 public institutions of higher
education in China in 1999, with an enrolment of 7.42 million students
(including 233,600 postgraduates). While the private education sector might
approach the public sector in terms of the number of institutions, it remains
far behind with respect to enrolment size. (Source: China Education and
Research Network).
2.
Literally, in Chinese, minban has a strong collective implication, while
private (sili) points to individual assets. It is extremely difficult to
pinpoint exactly the difference between private and minban educational institutions.
Actually, according to the "Regulations on the Social Forces Running
Educational Establishments", both minban and private institutions are not
allowed to make profits, but people simply don't believe the private
institutions would do so.
3. Among the
37 officially recognized private institutions, only one – Huanghe Science &
Technology University – awards baccalaureate degrees, while the others provide
only two- or three-year programs, leading to credentials similar to the
diplomas that are awarded by the community colleges in USA or the colleges of
applied arts and technology in Canada. The 37 institutions have an enrolment of
only 46,000 students, while the vast majority of students in private
institutions have to take nationally uniformed examinations at end of their
studies for certificates of higher education qualifications (Sources: Qu, 2000;
Yang, 2000; Zhang and Liu, 2000).
4. In the
pre-reform era, the Ministry of Education, the official body responsible for
making and implementing educational policy, tightly controlled student
enrolment, under which system students were allocated to different universities
without their consent, let alone taking account of students’ interest and
choice. With reform, university authorities generally have more autonomy and
enjoy flexibility in recruiting students, especially after the adoption of
decentralization policy in the educational realm since the mid-1980s.
5. Their
programs concentrate in such areas as English, Japanese, computer applications,
business administration, accountancy, law, finance, marketing, designing,
journalism, nursing, international trade, traditional medicine, clerk training,
and archives management. For more details, please see Zhongguo minban jiaoyu
wang [China private education network], available online
http://www.cvedu.com.cn
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