Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal Canada
February 2012
Whistleblowing has been defined in ordinary terms as follows:
The disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.1
Statutes and court cases tend to use terms such as "public interest disclosure" or "disclosure of wrongdoing" instead of the term "whistleblowing".
There is a long-standing principle that public servants owe a duty of loyalty to the Government of Canada. This means that public servants must exercise restraint in making public criticisms of the Government of Canada.2 This duty has been discussed in several court cases which are analyzed below. Essentially, this duty relates to the importance and necessity of an impartial and effective public service.3
There has been much debate in the courts about the balance between the right of freedom of expression (ss 2(b)) guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)4 and the duty of loyalty. As Ralph Nader put it, "at what point should an employee resolve that allegiance to society ... must supersede allegiance to the organization's policies...and then act on that resolve by informing outsiders or legal authorities?"5
Although this question is difficult to answer, there is a consensus that the duty of loyalty is not absolute and that certain circumstances do indeed justify breaching this duty. Defining these circumstances has therefore become the challenge in Canadian courts and tribunals.
In legal language, the issue of whistleblowing may be addressed in two key sources: statutes and decisions of judges. The development of the law of whistleblowing in both of these sources is traced below.
a) Court Cases: Pre-Charter
Although the law pertaining to the disclosure of wrongdoing is a relatively new field, the dialogue in the courts pertaining to an employee's ability to protect the public by disclosing wrongdoing is several decades old. In 1981, J.M. Weiler, an arbitrator at the time, discussed the general issue of reporting wrongdoing in the context of the public service. In that decision, Re Ministry of Attorney General, Corrections Branch and British Columbia Government Employees Union, he has this to say about the balance between freedom of expression and the duty of loyalty:
With respect to public criticisms of the employer, the duty of fidelity does not impose an absolute "gag rule" against an employee making any public statements that might be critical of his employer. An employee need not, in every circumstance, follow Cervantes' advice, "A closed mouth gathers no flies." The duty of fidelity does not mean that the Daniel Ellsbergs and Karen Silkwoods of the world must remain silent when they discover wrongdoing occurring at their place of employment. Neither the public nor the employer's long-term best interests are served if these employees, from fear of losing their jobs, are so intimidated that they do not bring information about wrongdoing at their place of employment to the attention of those who can correct such wrongdoing.6
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada established the foundation for the defense of whistleblowing in Fraser.7 The Court acknowledged the importance of freedom of expression, but ultimately did not find that the defense of whistleblowing could be upheld in this case.
The Supreme Court identified three circumstances in which a public servant may put freedom of expression above the duty of loyalty in order to make disclosures of wrongdoing by other public servants:
In order to determine whether there was an impact with respect to a public servant's ability to perform his or her duties (real or perceived), the Courts will look at possible impairment to perform both his or her specific job as well as any public service job. In some circumstances, an inference of impairment can be drawn without the need for direct evidence.9
Since Fraser, the courts have also identified relevant factors for determining whether the above conditions are met in a given situation:
If the disclosure of wrongdoing in question does not fit into one of the three identified circumstances, and taking into account the above-listed factors, the public servant may be subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal.
b) Court Cases: Post-Charter
The facts that gave rise to the Fraser decision occurred before the Charter came into place. Before the Charter, freedom of expression was simply characterized as a deep-rooted democratic value. When the Charter was passed, the right to freedom of expression was officially enshrined under section 2:
As a result, from that time on, any discussion around whistleblowing, freedom of expression and the duty of loyalty had to consider the Charter and the right to freedom of expression enshrined in section 2. In addition, section 1 of the Charter had to be taken into consideration.
As a general rule, rights guaranteed under the Charter can only very rarely be infringed, and if infringed, are subject to the reasonable limits of a democratic society. Section 1 of the Charter describes the test that the courts must consider in determining whether a Charter right should be infringed. That provision states that:
In Haydon 1, a post-Charter decision, the Federal Court discussed the duty of loyalty and the right to freedom of expression in the context of the Charter. The Court stated that:
The common law duty of loyalty as articulated in Fraser sufficiently accommodates the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter, and therefore constitutes a reasonable limit within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.19
Therefore the duty of loyalty, generally speaking, is a reasonable limit on the right to freedom of expression. In other words, it is generally accepted that the duty of loyalty is a good enough reason to infringe on the right to freedom of expression – but there are exceptions.
The rules set out in Fraser are still used to guide tribunals and courts as to when the right to freedom of expression should not be limited by this duty.
Several other cases have gone before the courts on the issue of whether or not there was whistleblowing. The analysis in those cases has generally required that if whistleblowing was found to have occurred, the next question was whether or not the disclosure was a reasonable limit under the Charter. These cases have considered many factors, such as:
Issues pertaining to reprisal and whistleblowing can be raised in a variety of fact situations and contexts. Here are some examples:
c) Whistleblowing Legislation
The first federal statute that addresses whistleblowing and reprisal in a comprehensive fashion is the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.25 This Act was passed in 2007. While principles from Fraser and Haydon are expressed in this statute, this legislation also provides a very comprehensive framework for looking at whistleblowing, reprisal, and the avenues for making a disclosure of wrongdoing.
Section 8 of the act expands upon the circumstances set out in Fraser, by defining a wrongdoing as any of the following:
In addition to the above expansion of the definition of 'wrongdoing', the Act also does the following:
As stated by the Tribunal in El-Helou v Courts Administration Service (2011-PT-01):26
the Act creates a much broader system for disclosure protection within the public service at several junctures and at different levels: internally to a supervisor or to the departmental Senior Officer (section 12) of a department or agency; externally to the Commissioner (section 13); or where there is not sufficient time to disclose a serious offence under Canadian legislation or an imminent risk of a substantial and specific danger, the disclosure may be made to the public (subsection 16(1)) [emphasis added].27
The Oxford Dictionary defines a reprisal as "an act of retaliation".28
a) The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act
Section 2 of the Act defines a reprisal as:
b) Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal Decisions
As mentioned above, the Act provides for the creation of this Tribunal to hear cases on reprisal referred to it by the Commissioner.
As highlighted in 2011-PT-01, "the Tribunal recognizes that it must play its role to ensure that this new legislative scheme not be enfeebled".31 In the same decision the Tribunal highlights that its jurisdiction is conferred by the application made by the Commissioner.32
However, once the Application has been referred to the Tribunal, the Tribunal plays a full adjudicative function with full powers of inquiry. It is up to the Tribunal to decide whether or not reprisal has occurred within the meaning of the Act. This adjudicative function emphasizes the importance that the parties be heard.
In 2011-PT-01 the Tribunal states that, "[t]his is confirmed in several provisions of the Act which emphasize the central importance afforded to the parties being heard, and of the right of this Tribunal to conduct a hearing with the full powers of inquiry of federally appointed judges".33 It should be underscored that Tribunal hearings are full hearings of evidence rather than simply reviews of the Commissioner's inquiry. It is also noteworthy that when the Tribunal has made an order relating to reprisal, an employer or any person may request that this order be filed in Federal Court to ensure its enforceability.34
The above text provides a brief background into the areas of whistleblowing and reprisal as well as the Tribunal's role in this area of the law. For further information on these topics, as well as on the Tribunal itself, please refer to the Tribunal's website.
1 Janet P Near & Marcia P Micelli, “Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing” (1985) 4 Journal of Business Ethics 1 at 4.
2 Fraser v Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 SCR 455 [Fraser].
(available on the Supreme Court of Canada's website)
3 Ibid, supra note 2, paragraph 21.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [Charter].
5 Ralph Nader, "An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing" in Ralph Nader, Peter J Petkas & Kate Blackwell, eds. Whistle Blowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional Responsibility (New York: Grossman, 1972), 3 at 5.
6 Re Ministry of Attorney General, Corrections Branch and British Columbia Government Employees Union (1981), 3 LAC (3d) 140 at 162-163.
7 Fraser, supra note 2.
8 Ibid, supra note 2, paragraph 41.
9 Ibid, paragraph 48.
10 Fraser, supra note 2, paragraph 48 and 50.
11 Ibid, paragraph 38.
12 Read v Canada (AG), 2005 FC 798 at paragraph 100.
(available on CanLII)
13 Haydon v Canada (Treasury Board) [2004] FC 749, [2005] 1 FCR 511, paragraph 63[Haydon 2], upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal, 2005 FCA 249.
(available on CanLII)
14 Haydon v Canada, [2001] 2 FC 82 at paragraph 120 [Haydon 1], Haydon 2 ibid, paragraph 47, Read, supra note 10, paragraph 123.
(available on the Federal Court's website)
15 Stenhouse v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 375, [2004] 4 FCR 437, paragraph 39.
(available on CanLII)
16 Chopra v Canada (Treasury Board), 2005 FC 958, [Chopra No. 2], paragraph 44.
(available on CanLII)
17 Charter, supra note 4, section 2.
18 Ibid, section 1.
19 Haydon I, supra note 14, paragraph 89. This conclusion was later quoted in Haydon 2, supra note 11.
20 Read, supra note 10.
21 Stenhouse, supra note 15.
22 Haydon II, supra note 13.
23 Chopra, supra note 16.
24 King v Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency) 2008 PSLRB 64.
(available on CanLII)
25 Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46 [the Act or the PSDPA].
26 El-Helou v Courts Administration Service, 2011 PT 01 [El-Helou 1].
(available on the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal's web site)
27 Ibid, paragraph 47.
28 Online Oxford Dictionary, accessed October 21st, 2011: reprisal
29 Section 33 of the Act reads:
33. (1) If, during the course of an investigation or as a result of any information provided to the Commissioner by a person who is not a public servant, the Commissioner has reason to believe that another wrongdoing, or a wrongdoing, as the case may be, has been committed, he or she may, subject to sections 23 and 24, commence an investigation into the wrongdoing if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the public interest requires an investigation. The provisions of this Act applicable to investigations commenced as the result of a disclosure apply to investigations commenced under this section.
Restriction
(2) The Commissioner may not, in the course of an investigation commenced under subsection (1), use a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada in respect of which subsection 39(1) of the Canada Evidence Act applies, or information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege, if the confidence or information is disclosed to the Commissioner.
30 El-Helou v Courts Administration Service, 2011 PT 02, paragraph 79 [El-Helou 2].
31 Ibid at paragraph 51.
32 Ibid at paragraphs 81-82.
33 Ibid, supra note 11 at paragraph 31.
34 Ibid.