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Restoring Accountability - Commissioner's Statement for February 1, 2006

February 1, 2006

Today the Commission is releasing its second and final report which we have entitled Restoring Accountability. It contains a series of recommendations for measures and reforms needed to prevent or discourage the type of mismanagement of advertising and sponsorship activities which were described in my Fact Finding Report released on November 1, 2005.

Two years earlier in November 2003, in the Auditor General's Report, which was the reason for the appointment of this Commission, Sheila Fraser, pointed out that the "sponsorship scandal" did not occur because of an absence of rules, but because the existing rules had not been observed. During the public hearings, the Commission learned that the non-observance of the rules was aggravated by a reluctance on the part of politicians and senior bureaucrats to recognize their responsibilities and to be accountable for their actions.

Whereas the Fact Finding Report focuses on the actions and responsibilities of individuals - the meetings, the transactions, the secret arrangements - this report looks more at government institutions. Our principal recommendations address the need for a rebalancing of the respective roles of two of those institutions, Parliament and the executive arm of the government. Parliament and parliamentarians were conspicuously absent from the events outlined in my first report. During the consultations we held as part of the preparation for this second report, I was asked by someone "Where were the Parliamentarians?" and I thought that that was a very revealing question. In recent years, academics and political observers have recognized the growing power of the executive arm of government, both in the Prime Minister's Office and the bureaucracy. At the same time, they have observed that Parliament, its members, and its committees have been gradually becoming less relevant, and weaker, with the effect that Parliament as an institution no longer fulfils its traditional role as a check on the exercise of the power of the executive, represented by the office of the Prime Minister, his advisors, his appointees, and the most senior bureaucrats.

Let me repeat what I have said on other occasions: the so-called "sponsorship scandal" was an aberration. The vast majority of public servants are competent individuals who serve the people of Canada with dedication in an ethical manner, respecting laws, regulations, policies and guidelines. But the most troubling facts were that this aberration originated in the Prime Minister's office in the first place, and was allowed to continue for so long, despite internal audit reports, investigations, warnings, and complaints by public servants involved in the actual contracts in question. These were the flashing red lights, the "canary in the coal mine", indicating that something basic was wrong. Coupled with this was a climate of excessive deference to the political arm of government within the public service. It was apparent that Parliament, which should be at centre stage in matters of accountability and responsibility for the expenditure of public funds, had been shifted to the side, kept in the dark, and not involved in important decisions of government policy.

Political scientists and central agency professionals spend a lot of time debating the true definition of "ministerial accountability", trying to identify the grey area where politics stops and administration begins. But Canadians, and I heard from many of them on our website, in submissions and at five regional roundtables, see the problem in a refreshingly simple way, when they ask legitimate questions such as "Who is in charge?", "Who is responsible?", "Who is accountable?" They want to know how their money is being spent, how decisions are made, and who is making them. As one respondent said, they want the Commission to do everything possible to ensure "all the doors will remain open and all the lights left on". They believe, and I agree with them, that transparency is vital to the operations of democratic institutions.

This second report focuses then on the two issues of Accountability and Transparency.

For anyone looking in my reports for specific sanctions against individuals who may have acted improperly, you will be disappointed. The terms of reference which gave me the mandate to conduct this inquiry specifically prohibit me from "expressing any conclusion or recommendation regarding the civil or criminal liability of any person or organization", and I am instructed" to ensure that the conduct of the inquiry does not jeopardize any ongoing criminal investigation or criminal proceedings". Investigations and criminal proceedings are still ongoing and I am unable to comment on them, or to answer questions on specific individuals or their actions.

What this report does is to propose a basic framework for restoring accountability.

Some of this makes for very dry reading - especially when compared to the first report. But each of the following links in the chain of accountability is important and needs to be analyzed and discussed:

  • Parliament, including the Public Accounts Committee;
  • The Office of the Prime Minister and the persons working there, and exempt staff generally;
  • The Privy Council Office and the Clerk;
  • Ministers and Deputy Ministers and the heads of agencies and Crown Corporations;
  • Career public servants; and
  • Other government organizations such as the Office of the Auditor General.

The report which is being released today examines closely each of these institutions. It is supported by three volumes containing the text of 17 research studies which were commissioned specifically to assist me in making my recommendations.

Dr. Donald Savoie, one of Canada's leading political scientists and the Director of Research for the Commission, was responsible for generating this research. He also recruited for me a special Advisory Committee, chaired by Mr. Raymond Garneau. This Committee traveled with me to conduct five roundtable discussions in different parts of Canada, where the members of the Committee and I met with leading academics, former politicians from various parties, former senior public servants, and journalists. Most of the subjects dealt with in the research and at the roundtables are discussed in the report, and inspired its recommendations. However, while I thank all Canadians and especially the eminent persons who participated in the roundtable discussions for their ideas and insights, in the end I have to take responsibility for the Report's final content and recommendations.

We are serious about the need to rebalance the roles of Parliament and government, about putting emphasis on accountability, and about promoting greater government transparency.

The report contains 18 recommendations for changes and reform, and an additional one requesting the government of the day to report to Parliament within 24 months on how it has addressed the Commission's recommendations. I will not go over the recommendations in detail; for a proper understanding of each recommendation and the reason for making it, you will have to read the report in its entirety. But in summary, here are some important themes:

  • We are urging greater resources for parliamentary committees, especially the Public Accounts Committee, and we want members of the Public Accounts Committee to hold membership for the duration of a government;
  • We want to depoliticize the Public Accounts Committee by limiting witnesses to Deputy Ministers and other senior public servants, and by discouraging appearances by Ministers who can be held to account elsewhere, such as on the floor of the House of Commons;
  • We want to clarify the respective responsibilities of Ministers and Deputy Ministers, and we propose a process for Deputy Ministers, who may disagree with a specific direction from a Minister, to document the disagreement;
  • We recommend a new method of selecting Deputy Ministers that is more open and competitive and we recommend that they be appointed for longer terms, to provide more stability and accountability;
  • We propose the creation of a Code of Conduct for Exempt Staff and recommend that they no longer be given preference for public service appointments;
  • We recommend the legislative enactment of a Public Service Charter for the reasons given in the report, one of them being that public servants should no longer be caught between their obligations to their political and bureaucratic superiors;
  • We recommend a tightening of the definition of "advertising" to avoid some of the problems that plagued the Sponsorship Program;
  • We recommend more independence and support for the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists;
  • We endorse the bulk of the recommendations made by the Information Commissioner for amendments to access to information legislation, and we emphasize the need for mandatory record-keeping;
  • We conclude that violations of the imperative requirements of the Financial Administration Act are so serious that in future they should be grounds for dismissal of the public servants concerned;
  • We recommend tighter controls on special reserve funds, and greater transparency to Parliament on their objectives and use;
  • And finally, we recommend that the CEOs of Crown Corporations be appointed, evaluated, and if necessary dismissed by their own Boards of Directors instead of by the Cabinet.

Throughout the report, we make a number of other suggestions on how the system of Canadian government may be made more accountable and transparent.

We do not recommend the adoption of a lot of new rules, policies and regulations, or the creation of new oversight organizations. What is really needed is a culture change, aiming to foster what one of our respondents called a "culture of integrity." During the consultations, I was struck by how committed Canadians are to our political values and institutions. But I also sensed that they feel profoundly betrayed and revolted by what had transpired during the "sponsorship scandal". I hope that the work of the Commission, which has now completed its mandate, will contribute to restoring public confidence in those values and institutions.


Last Modified: 2006-02-01 Important Notices

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